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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONY R. MAESTAS, 
Defendant/Appe11ant 
Case No. 960831-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant Tony R. Maestas ("Maestas") has raised three 
issues on appeal: (1) whether defense counsel was ineffective at 
trial for failing to discover and present evidence that would 
impeach the credibility of the state's key witness, Tony Waldron 
("Waldron"); (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that 
Maestas willfully violated the conditions of his probation where 
he suffered mental and health problems that went untreated; and 
(3) whether evidence seized as incident to an unlawful arrest 
should have been suppressed. (See Brief of Appellant.) 
In response to the first issue, the state does not dispute 
that Maestas' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
discover and present evidence relevant to impeaching Waldron's 
credibility. (See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 13-20.) Rather, the 
state argues the deficient performance did not prejudice Maestas 
because "Waldron's testimony was abundantly corroborated." (S.B. 
at 15.) In support of its claim, the state relies on testimony 
that was not before the jury, but was presented during a pre-
trial hearing. Since the state is unable to identify 
overwhelming evidence that may have impacted on the jury's 
decision to convict absent the error, the state's harmless-error 
argument is unpersuasive. 
With respect to the second issue on appeal, the state 
misconstrues facts in order to argue they support that Maestas 
willfully violated his conditions of probation. The undisputed 
record reflects that counselors at the Odyssey House program took 
Maestas' suicidal ideations seriously; they did not believe he 
was manipulative; and they identified him as a "mental health 
person." Beyond the mental/physical health issues, the counselors 
agreed and testified that Maestas was capable of complying and 
did comply with Odyssey House rules. However, Odyssey House was 
unable to treat Maestas1 mental health issues. The facts fail to 
support that Maestas willfully violated probation. He is entitled 
to "vacation of the revocation order." (S.B. at 38.) 
As for the third issue on appeal, Maestas maintains that 
Department of Corrections ("DOC") officers exceeded statutory 
authority in involving Maestas in the drug sting. Thus, Maestas1 
arrest, which served as a basis for the warrantless search, was 
unlawful. The state is unable to dispute that the investigation 
and subsequent arrest were illegal. Rather, the state claims 
Maestas is not entitled to suppression of evidence seized during 
the unlawful arrest. Maestas maintains he has a remedy as further 
set forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE, RATHER, IT CLAIMS THE DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WAS 
HARMLESS, AND IMPROPERLY RELIES ON INFORMATION THAT WAS NOT 
BEFORE THE JURY TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM, 
In this matter, the state does not deny that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to discover and present evidence 
2 
impacting on Waldron's credibility. (See S.B. at 13-20.) 
Indeed, the state implicitly acknowledges the legal error. (Id.) 
However, the state claims the error does not warrant reversal on 
the grounds that Waldron's testimony was "heavily corroborated." 
(S.B. 16.) In support of its claim, the state relies on 
information that was not before the jury, and facts that were not 
in evidence. The state's argument emphasizes the harm in the 
error, compelling reversal of the matter for a new trial. 
Specifically, the state claims Waldron's "story of the crime 
was told in detail at the suppression hearing without Waldron's 
testifying." (S.B. at 16 (emphasis added).) Yet testimony from 
the suppression hearing did not impact on the jury's 
deliberations since the information was not before the jury. 
Thus, the information is irrelevant to the prejudice analysis. 
See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1989) (in 
considering trial error, court looked to charge against 
defendant, trial testimony, and use of the improper evidence at 
trial); State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997) (court 
considered evidence presented to jury to determine if trial error 
was harmless); U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) 
(harmless-error doctrine focuses on underlying fairness of the 
trial); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404-06 (1991) (application 
of harmless-error test to trial error requires "evaluation of the 
evidence considered by the jury"). 
Next, the state has identified the following additional 
"evidence" as providing overwhelming support for the convictions: 
3 
Officer Allen saw defendant enter the apartment, followed by 
two Mexicans (R. 402-03.) He also observed one of the 
Mexicans - the one who was not defendant - leave the 
apartment before the drug deal occurred (R. 4 04-05). 
Officers Allen and Lucey then monitored the entire drug 
transaction over the body wire Waldron was wearing (R. 3 88, 
403-06). Shortly afterward, Appleman, after talking to 
defendant and his companion, informed Gabaldon that 
defendant had sold Waldron some cocaine (R. 3 63). 
Finally, when police stopped defendant and his 
companion, Officer Sundquist searched defendant and found a 
folded dollar bill containing cocaine and a wallet with 
$385.25 (R. 419, 432.) 
(S.B. at 16-17.J1 The state has named 4 additional witnesses who 
allegedly "corroborated" Waldron's testimony implicating Maestas 
in a drug transaction: Allen, Lucey, Gabaldon, and Sundquist. 
The state has summarized the "overwhelming" "evidence" as 
follows: "In sum, two officers overheard the drug transaction at 
the time when only defendant and Waldron were in the apartment, 
defendant later told Appleman that he had sold cocaine to 
Waldron, and defendant was found with money and cocaine on him 
when he was stopped immediately after the sale." (S.B. at 17.) 
The pages from the record cited by the state (R. 388, 363, 402-
06, 419, 432) are attached hereto as Addendum A. They do not 
1 In considering the trial evidence, the state asserted that 
Maestas' testimony consisted of "an incredible story." (S.B. at 
17.) The state does not rely on that "story" as a basis for the 
conviction. (See id.) Rather, the state apparently relies on the 
testimony to suggest that it was unbelievable, and/or supported a 
charge for theft of $100. (Id.) To the extent the state believed 
it could convict Maestas of theft, it should have charged Maestas 
with the crime. The state's theft reference is irrelevant. 
As to the believability of Maestas' testimony, if the jury 
believed Maestas, it may have acquitted him on the distribution 
charge. On the other hand, the jury could have given Maestas' 
"testimony no weight, wholly disregarding [the] testimony." 
Krauss v. Utah St. Dept. of Trans., 852 P.2d 1014, 1022 (Utah 
App. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Child v. Newsome, 892 
P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995). Either way, as the state suggests, 
Maestas' testimony is irrelevant to the analysis. 
4 
support the state's assertions. 
Specifically, while the state claims Allen observed "one of 
the Mexicans - the one who was not defendant - leave the 
apartment before the drug deal occurred" (S.B. at 16 (emphasis 
added)), Allen did not testify to that effect. Allen stated that 
he could not describe the person who left the apartment. Allen's 
testimony does not support that Maestas remained in the apartment 
and/or engaged in a transaction. (R. 402-05.) In addition, Allen 
testified that the information he overheard on the wire during 
the alleged transaction was abstract and he could not remember 
what was said. Allen was unable to testify that based on what he 
heard, Maestas was involved in a transaction. (R. 403-06.) 
Next, Lucey testified that he was aware that a "sale" had 
gone down when Waldron "relayed" that information to him. (R. 
388-89.) Lucey did not corroborate Waldron's testimony. Rather, 
he testified that he relied on Waldron's information and descrip-
tions to effectuate an arrest against Maestas. (R. 388-89.) 
With respect to Gabaldon, she was a corrections officer 
working with Waldron. She and Waldron contacted Appleman in order 
to buy drugs. Appleman was actively and criminally involved in 
drug transactions. (S.B. at 9-10; R. 233-34.) Gabaldon testified 
at trial as follows: "[Appleman] came up to the car and she said 
- she pointed to Tony and she says, "well, he already sold him 
cocaine.'" (R. 363.)2 Maestas was with another man when Appleman 
2 Throughout Gabaldon's testimony, she referred to Maestas as 
"Mr. Maestas" or "Tony Maestas," and she referred to Tony Waldron 
as "Tony." (See R. 363-64.) Thus, Gabaldon's references to 
"Tony" are confusing as well as unreliable. 
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pointed. (Id.) The state claims Gabaldon's testimony supports a 
conviction against Maestas. Yet it is fraught with credibility 
and reliability concerns. 
Specifically, although no objection was made to the testi-
mony, it constituted hearsay, which is not reliable evidence. 
State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1957) (hearsay is 
unreliable). Also, Appleman's motives/credibility in implicating 
others were questionable due to her drug involvement. In sum, 
Gabaldon's hearsay testimony concerning Appleman's statements is 
not overwhelming evidence of a transaction involving Maestas. 
Finally, the state claims Sundquist seized evidence from 
Maestas supporting the convictions in this case. (S.B. at 17.) 
Yet, the seized evidence fails to support all elements of the 
first degree felony offense for distributing a controlled 
substance within 1000 feet of a public school. (See R. 57 
(elements instruction).) This case should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial on that basis.3 
POINT II. THE STATE MISCONSTRUES THE RECORD TO ARGUE THAT 
MAESTAS WILLFULLY VIOLATED HIS PROBATION. 
As set forth in Maestas' opening brief, after he was 
convicted of distribution and possession in this case, the trial 
court sentenced him to probation at Odyssey House. (Brief of 
Appellant at 24-25; R. 104-06.) Shortly thereafter, the court 
revoked probation. Maestas maintains the trial court abused its 
3 The state appears to have responded to a due process claim that 
was not raised as a separate issue on appeal. (S.B. at 18.) 
Rather, the matter relates to the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, which the state does not dispute. 
6 
discretion in entering the revocation order since the record 
fails to support that Maestas willfully violated the terms of his 
probation. See State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277 (Utah App. 
1990) (violation must be willful to cause probation revocation; 
if not willful, trial court must make findings as to whether 
defendant posed present danger to others).4 The mental health 
concerns at issue here were beyond Maestas1 control. 
The state claims the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion, and that testimony presented at the revocation 
proceeding supported the determination that Maestas knowingly and 
intentionally violated probation. (S.B. at 40-42.) 
Yet, in its argument, the state acknowledged the following 
evidence supporting Maestas1 good faith efforts: Odyssey House 
personnel testified that Maestas had the "ability to comply with 
the rules"; Maestas' "suicide threats" were "real" and a "serious 
affair"; and Odyssey House personnel identified Maestas as a 
"mental health person." (S.B. at 42-43.) 
Also, personnel informed Maestas that if the mental health 
issues continued "he would not be able to stay at Odyssey House." 
(S.B. at 42.) According to the state, that evidence constituted a 
"warning" from personnel that Maestas should control his mental 
health issues. (S.B. at 42.) The state's interpretation is not 
4 The trial court in this case did not consider whether Maestas 
posed a present danger to others. According to this Court in 
Hodges, in the event such facts are relevant to a revocation 
determination, the trial court must enter "clear findings," 
identifying the "evidence relied on" in making such a 
determination. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 275. 
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supported by evidence presented at the revocation hearing. 
Director Tracy Anderson testified that he explained to Maestas 
that if the suicide ideation continued, it would be necessary to 
terminate Maestas' residency since Odyssey House could not 
provide him with the necessary care and treatment. (R. 619-20.) 
Clearly, we're not a psychiatric facility. There are a 
number of hours during - there are hours in the facility in 
which there's not a professional doctor or clinician there. 
There are people on call. So if a person is suicidal or is 
gesturing, having difficulties that way, or if - well, in 
that respect, if that's occurring, they need to be watched 
by someone in the facility. And that's usually done by an 
upper level resident, meaning someone who's been in the 
facility quite some time, a level four. 
(R. 620.) 
Indeed, personnel sought to treat and assist Maestas, 
supporting the determination that they considered the matter to 
be beyond Maestas' control. However, they were inexperienced in 
addressing Maestas' issues. Therefore, Maestas would not be able 
to continue with the program since he had "real" and "serious" 
concerns that could not be treated there. Odyssey House personnel 
responded by seeking to terminate Maestas' residency. They could 
not provide proper care. (R. 619-20.) The concerns do not 
support that Maestas willfully violated probation. 
Next, the state claims clinician Albert Nieto testified that 
Maestas was manipulative. (S.B. at 43.) The state misconstrues 
Nieto's testimony. Specifically, he stated he first observed 
Maestas' ideation during a graduation party, where it escalated 
then ended that day in an individual consultation with Maestas 
and a group session. (R. 627-28.) Thereafter, Maestas was placed 
on continuous observation, taken off observation for two nights, 
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then taken to the medical center for examinations. When Maestas 
returned, the suicide threats continued. (R. 628-30.) Odyssey 
House was not equipped to treat Maestas' issues. (Id.) 
The judge asked whether Nieto believed that Maestas was 
acting out or manipulative. Nieto answered that at first he 
perceived Maestas to be manipulative, but as the ideation 
continued, he did not believe that to be the case. The judge then 
asked, "[I]s that because after he initially began it he then 
found himself in such a frenzy? Would that be a fair statement?" 
Nieto responded: "You're -- regarding his escalation and his --
yes. Yes." (S.B. at 43 (citing R. 632-33).) 
The state claims Nieto considered Maestas to be 
manipulative, and his response to the "frenzy" comment reflected 
that Nieto believed "defendant [worked himself] into such a 
frenzy that his further misconduct was caused more by that frenzy 
than by any intent to manipulate." (S.B. at 43.) The state 
misconstrues the evidence. 
The judge's follow-up question regarding the frenzy relates 
to Nieto's early observations on the day of the graduation party 
where Nieto initially and incorrectly believed Maestas was acting 
out. As Nieto previously testified, he had later opportunities to 
observe Maestas where he was placed on a continuous watch, taken 
off the watch, then taken to the medical center. Maestas was 
returned to the Odyssey House and further observed. Nieto's 
testimony reflects that when he first observed Maestas --on the 
day of the graduation party and frenzy --he believed Maestas was 
manipulative. As Nieto continued his observations, he determined 
9 
Maestas was not manipulative. (R. 627-33.) 
The judge's follow-up question regarding the frenzy related 
only to the graduation party and what may have influenced Nieto's 
first, incorrect impression. As Nieto testified, his continued 
observations were that Maestas was not manipulative. (Id.) 
The facts presented at the probation revocation hearing do 
not reflect that Maestas willfully violated probation. Rather, 
the facts support that Maestas had the ability to comply with 
Odyssey House rules and made a bona fide effort to comply with 
them, Maestas' mental and physical health issues were out of his 
control, and the Odyssey House personnel were unable to properly 
treat them since they were not equipped to handle such matters. 
Since the Odyssey House personnel were unable to treat Maestas, 
they filed papers to terminate Maestas' residency. While the 
Odyssey House personnel may have felt they had no choice in 
filing revocation papers, the trial judge did. Other programs 
were available. (See R. 586-87 (other programs available 
included First Step, Project Reality, and Salvation Army).) 
Since Maestas did not willfully violate probation, the court 
abused its discretion. This matter should be remanded with 
directions to the trial court to vacate the revocation order. 
POINT III. THE STATE'S PRIMARY CONTENTION WITH THE UNLAWFUL 
ARREST AND RESULTING SEARCH RELATES TO THE REMEDY. 
A. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE LEGAL SUPPORT OR ANALYSIS 
FOR ITS CLAIM THAT THE ARREST WAS LAWFUL. 
Maestas maintains that corrections officers here lacked 
power and/or authority under Utah law to involve Maestas in the 
10 
drug sting and to arrest him. The arrest served as the basis for 
the warrantless search. Since the investigation and arrest in 
this case were unauthorized and unlawful, the search incident to 
the arrest was illegal. (Brief of Appellant at 32-3 9.) 
In responding to this issue on appeal the state claims DOC 
officers lawfully involved Maestas in the operation and arrested 
him. (S.B. at 23-28.) The state appears to rely on Utah law to 
support its argument, and in the alternative suggests Maestas was 
a target of the operation and/or "stepped into" the drug sting. 
The state's claims are not persuasive as set forth below. 
1. DOC Officers Exceeded Statutory Authority. 
The state acknowledges that Utah law in effect in 1992 --
concerning the DOC and its duties and authority to act -- governs 
this case. (S.B. 25 and n. 8.) The state also acknowledges that 
the law in effect in 1992 stated that the purpose of the DOC 
"include[d]:" protecting the public from adjudicated offenders 
through institutional care and confinement; implementing court-
ordered punishment; providing program opportunities for 
adjudicated offenders; managing programs that take into account 
the needs of victims; and supervising probationers and parolees. 
(S.B. 25-26 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991)).) 
According to the state, the use of the term "include" in the 
statute allows this Court to construe the statute to authorize 
the corrections officers' conduct here. The state claims the term 
"implies the existence of unspecified secondary purposes" (S.B. 
at 26), but fails to identify the secondary purposes or how they 
relate to this case. • Also, the state claims that notwithstanding 
11 
Utah statutory law, "the duties of the DOC were not "specifically 
limited'" (S.B. at 27), thereby suggesting that the DOC had 
unlimited power and authority to police Salt Lake County streets 
and/or to ensnare persons -- who were not involved in institu-
tional care and confinement, court-ordered punishment, programs 
for adjudicated offenders, or programs for probationers and 
parolees --in clandestine operations.5 The state has disregarded 
the law of statutory construction to advance such a position. 
The use of the word "include" in the statute invites 
application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. That doctrine 
recognizes that where general words are used in a statute in 
connection with a specific and particular enumeration of persons 
or things, the general words are not to be construed in their 
broadest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons 
or things of the same general kind or class as those things 
specifically identified. See Matter of Disconnection of Certain 
Terr, from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 1983) (where 
general language is used in statute with specific words, rules of 
construction require that general words be restricted to a sense 
analogous to specific words); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 
P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980); State v. Voat, 824 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 
App. 1991); Fields v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 
5 The state also cites to Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-8 (Supp. 1991) . 
However, its reference to that provision is unclear. Section 64-
13-8 allows the DOC to designate which employees may have the 
authority and power of peace officers, to administer oaths and to 
bear firearms. That provision does not expand the purpose, 
authority, or jurisdiction of the DOC beyond the purpose 
identified in Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6. 
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677, 678 (Utah App. 1988); State v Lvon, 584 P.2d 844, 845-46 
(Utah 1978) (statute vesting campus officer with "peace officer" 
authority restricted officer to acts occurring on campus or in 
connection with protecting campus interests, and did not permit 
investigation into residential area or subsequent arrest). 
Further, Utah appellate courts consider the statute as a 
whole and construe general language to be harmonious with 
specific language. Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 
268 (Utah 1995) (statute should be construed as a whole with 
provisions harmonious with each other). 
Also, as indicated in Maestas' opening brief, in 1993 the 
legislature amended the "purposes" statute to include additional 
substantive duties. The amended statute provides that the DOC 
shall "investigate criminal conduct involving offenders 
incarcerated in a state correctional facility;" and "cooperate 
and exchange information with other state, local, and federal law 
enforcement agencies to achieve greater success in prevention and 
detection of crime and apprehension of criminals." Utah Code 
Ann. § 64-13-6(1) (Supp. 1993). The substantive changes support 
the determination that the DOC was not vested with such powers 
and authority in 1992. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 
n. 11 (Utah 1988) (amendment to statute creates presumption that 
legislature intended to change existing law), appeal after 
remand, 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993); State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 
1367-68 and n.4 (Utah 1987) (statutory amendments that came into 
effect one month after incident were not applicable to case); 
State v. Amador, 804 -P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); see also 
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Leyba v. Rencrer, 845 P.2d 780, 782 (N.M. 1992) (court presumes 
that when legislature enacts new statute, it intended to 
establish new law or change previously existing law). 
Thus, it would be inconsistent with established doctrines to 
interpret the statute defining the duties, authority and power of 
the DOC in 1992 to include investigating, detecting and/or 
preventing crime in conjunction with local law enforcement; 
fighting crime generally outside the jurisdiction of the 
correctional facility; involving ordinary citizens in matters 
unrelated to managing correctional facilities or offenders; or 
effectuating arrests and searches under such circumstances. 
The state has failed to identify a basis for expanding the 
duties/authority of the DOC beyond the statutory provisions to 
include the activities identified here. As in Fixel, 744 P.2d at 
1366, the corrections officers here were beyond their authority 
and jurisdiction in pursuing the sting operation outside the 
prison, and/or involving Maestas in the matter and arresting him. 
(Brief of Appellant at 32-39.) 
2. Maestas Was Not a Targeted Supplier and Did Not "Fit the 
Profile." 
Next, the state attempts to justify the DOC's conduct by 
claiming that involving Maestas in the clandestine operation was 
appropriate because corrections officers were entitled to manage 
the incarceration of offenders by investigating the infiltration 
of contraband into the prison and Maestas "fit the profile of 
suppliers the agents were targeting." (S.B. at 27-28.) 
A similar argument was raised by the state in Lyon, 584 
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P.2d at 845, and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In that 
case, a security officer for Weber State College suspected 
defendant may have been involved in criminal activity at the 
college Events Center. Id. The officer chased the defendant 
through public streets and arrested him in a driveway. The state 
claimed the officer was justified in pursuing and arresting 
defendant because the officer's actions were required to protect 
the interests and property of the college, including the Events 
Center. The Utah Supreme Court was not persuaded and stated there 
was nothing about the officer's observations that would give 
reason to believe defendant's actions involved the college or 
anything on campus. Id. at 845. The arrest was improper. Id. 
The state's argument here is likewise unpersuasive. State 
witnesses testified that DOC officers were targeting specific 
drug dealers who were identified on a list and suspected of 
supplying drugs to inmates in prison. Maestas was not on that 
list and he was not a target (R. 23 9); the trial judge found that 
Maestas' involvement was an accidental happening. (R. 2 84; 
see also 363 (Maestas was not targeted supplier).) Thus, 
ensnaring Maestas in the operation outside the prison and 
arresting him accomplished nothing with respect to managing the 
care of inmates or the prison, or ending drug transactions there. 
There was no reason to believe that involving Maestas would be 
relevant to managing the prison or inmates. 
Also, with respect to the "profile," the state claims 
Maestas "was on notice that Waldron was a prisoner out on home 
release" (S.B. at 28)-, thereby suggesting that Maestas sold drugs 
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to Waldron for the purpose of making drugs available to prison 
inmates. To support its claim, the state cites to Waldronfs trial 
testimony where he stated he disclosed to Maestas that he was "on 
a home visit." (R. 376-77.) Significantly, Waldron did not 
identify when his home visit would expire (hours or days), that 
he planned to distribute drugs to other inmates, or that he would 
be taking drugs to the prison. Maestas was not on notice that 
"cocaine would find its way into the prison." (S.B. at 28.) 
Finally, the state claims Maestas "stepped into" the trans-
action and that corrections officers "were not required to ignore 
defendant's criminal conduct." That is a distortion of the 
facts. Waldron was working with the DOC and was aware of the 
specific, targeted suppliers. (R. 385-86.) He was in 
communication with corrections officers through a body wire and 
in communication with Gabaldon as a result of her direct 
involvement. (R. 3 86-88.) Waldron and corrections officers 
would have known that Maestas was not a targeted supplier. 
Nevertheless, Waldron initiated the alleged drug transaction by 
asking Maestas about cocaine. (R. 376.) Waldron and the DOC 
officers could have avoided the unauthorized involvement of 
Maestas in the matter by not initiating the alleged transaction. 
Also, this case does not present a situation where 
corrections officers and the informant stumbled onto a crime in 
progress (see State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981) (while 
officer was patrolling, he came upon a suspected burglary and was 
not required to ignore his suspicions in investigating the 
matter) (cited in S.fi. at 28)); they had control over the matter. 
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The corrections officers set up the operation and initiated 
the transaction, knowing who the targets were and the purpose of 
the operation. Maestas was not a targeted supplier. By involving 
Maestas in the operation, DOC officers accomplished nothing. They 
acted outside their statutory authority in involving Maestas in 
the transaction and unlawfully arresting him. 
B. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, SUPPRESSION IS A 
REMEDY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FIXEL. 
1. Suppression of the Evidence Is an Appropriate Remedy 
Under The Fourth Amendment. 
The state claims Maestas is not entitled to suppression of 
the evidence for the warrantless search incident to an unlawful 
arrest. (S.B. at 2 9.) It suggests that courts in other 
jurisdictions have refused to suppress evidence in similar 
circumstances. (S.B. at 29-31.) Yet, in support of its position, 
the state has cited to cases which do not relate to a search, see 
Abbott v. City of Crocker, Missouri, 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142 (Mass. 1986); City of 
Kettering v. Hollen, 416 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio 1980); and cases where 
officers obtained a proper search warrant from a magistrate 
identifying the defendant as the specific target of the 
search/arrest, but failed to comply with a technical rule in 
executing the otherwise valid warrant. See U.S. v. Gilbert, 942 
F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1991); People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28 
(Colo. 1995). 
In cases cited by the state in support of its claim that the 
Fourth Amendment does not provide a remedy, defendant was 
specifically identified in the warrant or he was the focus of the 
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investigation. (See cases cited at S.B. 29-32.)6 The intrusion in 
each case into defendant's privacy seemed inevitable. Those cases 
are distinguishable. No warrant to search or arrest Maestas was 
issued in this matter. Maestas was not a target. The intrusion 
was avoidable. 
The state also identified Pennsylvania law as supporting the 
proposition that the exclusionary rule does not automatically 
apply when evidence is obtained during an investigation outside 
the officer's territorial jurisdiction. (S.B. at 30-31 (citing 
Saul, 499 A.2d at 361).) Utah appellate courts consider 
Pennsylvania law to be persuasive. See Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-
69 (citing Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1985), for 
proposition that suppression may not be automatic remedy); State 
v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 411 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Commonwealth 
v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991)). 
Pennsylvania law on the subject has been recently explained 
in Commonwealth v. Kiner, 697 A.2d 262 (Pa. Super. 1997) . There, 
the court considered whether suppression was an appropriate 
remedy when an officer acted without a warrant and outside 
statutory authority to investigate crime and effectuate an 
arrest. The court stated: 
We acknowledge that our supreme court has held that not 
every perceived violation of the law requires the automatic 
6 See for example, Commonwealth v. Saul, 499 A.2d 358, 359 
(Pa.Super. 1985) (defendant was express target); U.S. v. Gilbert, 
942 F.2d 1537, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1991) (search warrant 
identified defendant's premises); U.S. v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1261 
(10th Cir. 1999) (warrant identified defendant's residence); 
People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 29 (Colo. 1995) (warrant 
identified defendant and his residence). 
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exclusion of evidence. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 
396, 490 A.2d 421 (1985) (a violation of the rules of 
criminal procedure does not necessarily require suppression 
of evidence which is seized by police pursuant to a search 
warrant). If the violation is largely technical in nature, 
suppression of the evidence is not warranted. Commonwealth 
v. Saul, 346 Pa. Super. 155, 499 A.2d 358 (1985) (police 
failed to proceed properly in an extra-territorial investi-
gation; however, suppression of the evidence was not needed) 
.... However, where the violation of the law implicated 
constitutional concerns and/or fundamental rights, exclusion 
of the evidence seized by police is warranted. [Commonwea11h 
v. Price, 406 Pa.Super 166, 593 A.2d 1288 (1991), aff'd, 543 
Pa. 403, 672 A.2d 280 (1996).] In those cases involving 
arrest in the absence of statutory authority, this Court has 
held that suppression of the evidence is the appropriate 
remedy. Price, supra; [Commonwealth v. Brandt, 691 A.2d 934 
(Pa. Super. 1997)]; Commonwealth v. Savage, 403 Pa. Super. 
446, 589 A.2d 696 (1991) (campus police officer was without 
authority to arrest driver who ran a red light, and, 
therefore, suppression of the evidence was needed). We have 
explicitly held that when an officer does not have statutory 
authority to arrest a suspect, the violation is substantive 
and implicates fundamental, constitutional rights. Savage, 
supra. When a suspect is arrested unlawfully by an agent 
acting as "an instrument of the state," the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution are violated.[] Price, 
supra. "The remedy of exclusion under such facts is not 
invoked as a means of punishing the state, but rather as a 
means of assuring that a defendant's constitutional rights 
are protected adequately when infringed upon by the use of 
unlawful state action. Id. 672 A.2d at 284. Our supreme 
court has held that in determining whether the exclusionary 
rule applies, the good or bad faith of an individual acting 
under the color of state law is irrelevant. Id. See Brandt, 
supra (where housing authority officers who did not have 
jurisdiction to arrest the defendant, suppression of the 
evidence was proper). "If we did not suppress the evidence 
in this type of case, the law could be made a mockery by 
willful noncompliance without any adverse consequences." 
Savage, 589 A.2d at 700 (citation omitted). 
Kiner, 697 A.2d at 268-69. 
Maestas1 case is guided by Kiner. Corrections officers acted 
outside their statutory authority in involving Maestas in an 
investigation and arresting him, see Point III.A., supra, and 
they searched Maestas incident to the unlawful arrest. (Brief of 
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Appellant at 32-48.) The lack of authority was fundamental under 
Utah law. 
The Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless searches only in 
limited circumstances, including when agents have authority over 
an investigation and the search is incident to a lawful arrest. 
Where corrections officers were without authority in the matter, 
the evidence seized during the search must be suppressed. 
Here, corrections officers had no warrant, Maestas was not a 
target of the investigation, the officers had no statutory 
authority or permission from local agencies to expand the sting 
beyond its limited purpose and to effectuate an arrest. The 
intrusion was illegal, inappropriate and avoidable. Where cor-
rections officers exceeded their authority in the investigation 
and arrest, suppression of the evidence would be proper. 
2. Utah Law Supports Suppression as a Remedy in this Case. 
The state has recognized that in Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369, 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that suppression may be appropriate 
as a remedy for violating state law where, 
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search might 
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the 
Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of inten-
tional and deliberate disregard of a provision of the Rule. 
Id. The state asserts the violation here was not prejudicial 
because it "had nothing to do with the extent of the intrusion on 
defendant's privacy." (S.B. at 33 (citing State v. Buck, 756 
P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988)).) The state focuses on the arrest, 
ignoring that the underlying investigation involving Maestas was 
improper. If corrections officers had adhered to their purpose, 
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the investigation would not have diverted to and ensnared 
Maestas. Thus, the arrest and search would not have occurred, 
triggering application of the suppression remedy identified in 
the first scenario under Fixel. Pixel. 744 P.2d at 1369. 
Indeed, the state has cited to cases that emphasize that 
point. Specifically, the state has relied on Utah cases where 
officers possessed a legitimate and justified basis for 
interfering with the searched premises and/or defendantf s 
privacy, but effectuated a search under circumstances violating 
Utah law. The cases are distinguishable from this matter in that 
in each case, either defendant or the searched premises was 
identified as the target of the investigation. State v. Rowef 
850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (officers possessed search warrant for 
specific premises; appeal concerned supporting affidavit); State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (officers possessed proper 
warrant specifically identifying premises, but improperly 
executed it by forcibly breaking into premises); Fixel, 744 P.2d 
at 1369 (undercover officer targeted defendant as drug dealer in 
clandestine operation outside officer's jurisdiction); State v. 
Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah App. 1993) (officers had valid 
warrant to search defendants' property during day; question on 
appeal related to execution of warrant at 6:30 p.m.) 
In Buck, Rowe, and Simmons, officers obtained an otherwise 
valid warrant to search the specific premises at issue. The 
defendant in each case challenged only the manner in which the 
warrant was executed. In each case, the search was inevitable. 
In Fixel, the defendant was the specific target. Thus, defendant 
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was unable to show prejudice. 
In this case, Maestas was not the target of the operation. 
If the officers had adhered to their purpose, un-targeted persons 
would not have been ensnared. Maestas would not have been 
involved in the operation. While officers in Buck, Simmons, and 
Rowe otherwise had authority to interfere with the specific 
defendant's privacy, corrections officers here did not have the 
authority via statute, or through local law enforcement agencies, 
to proceed with the underlying clandestine operation involving 
Maestas. There is no evidence that any local law agency was 
involved in or aware of, or would have approved the undercover 
operation. Thus, if corrections officers had followed the rule, 
the investigation would not have diverted to Maestas, and Maestas 
would not have been arrested or searched. 
The state asserts Maestas' prejudice argument should be 
disregarded because it is "mere speculation." (S.B. at 34.) Yet 
the argument is based in Rowe, Buck, Simmons, and Fixel. In 
addition, prejudice analyses by nature concern possibilities and 
probabilities. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 
1987) (considering the "spectrum of probabilities" that exist in 
a prejudice analysis). Thus, Maestas' argument is appropriate. 
Finally, the state claims Maestas' argument fails in 
considering the alternative scenario for the remedy under Fixel: 
whether corrections officers acted intentionally or with 
deliberate disregard of the rule. The state claims three facts 
"negate" the inference of "bad faith": (1) the statute was un-
clear with respect to the authority of the officers; (2) Maestas 
22 
"thrust[ed] himself" into the alleged transaction; and (3) 
Maestas was on notice that Waldron was an inmate. (S.B. at 34.) 
As set forth above, the statutory language concerning the 
officers' powers/duties plainly did not authorize the DOC 
officers to generally fight crime or transact drugs in the 
streets of Salt Lake County. See Point III.A., supra. In 
addition, corrections officers and Waldron specifically 
identified individuals who were targets of the operation. (See R. 
385-86.) The fact that Maestas was not a target reflects a 
deliberate disregard for the purpose of the operation. 
With respect to points (2) and (3), as set forth above, see 
Point III.A.2., supra, Waldron initiated the alleged transaction 
with Maestas; and Maestas had no reason to believe that any drugs 
allegedly sold to Waldron may end up in the prison for 
distribution. (R. 376-77.) The state's argument is unpersuasive. 
Under Utah law, Maestas is entitled to suppression as a remedy. 
C. THE STATE DISPUTES APPLICATION OF THE PLAIN-ERROR OR 
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL DOCTRINE BY CLAIMING NO 
SETTLED APPELLATE LAW EXISTED ON THE ISSUE. THAT ASSERTION 
DISREGARDS FIXEL. 
The state disputes application of the plain error doctrine 
and/or that counsel was ineffective. It claims the error in this 
case was not apparent since no appellate law existed to guide 
counsel or the trial court with respect to this matter. (S.B. at 
3 5.) Yet the Utah Supreme Court issued its ruling in Fixel in 
1987. That case specifically considered whether it was unlawful 
for an officer to pursue an undercover drug operation outside his 
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court in that case considered an 
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officer's authority as set forth in the statutes, and found that 
the undercover operation was unlawful. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369; 
see Point III.A., supra. 
The Fixel court also acknowledged application of the 
exclusionary rule as a remedy for a constitutional violation. 
Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69; see Point III.B.l., supra. It ruled 
in that case that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. Fixel, 
744 P.2d at 1368-69. 
The court further identified the analysis to be considered 
by trial courts in determining whether the unlawful operation 
compelled suppression of the evidence under state law. Fixel, 
744 P.2d at 1369; see Point III.B.2., supra. The Fixel case 
provides plain guidance to trial courts. It was in effect in 
1992 when the trial court considered Maestas1 case and his 
related suppression issue. (See R. 229-286 (court considered 
suppression of the evidence on the basis that officers lacked 
probable cause to arrest).) 
Thus, established case law made the error here apparent. 
See State v. Saunders, Case No. 950295, slip op. at 24 (Utah 
1999) (since Utah case law concerning instructions on jury 
unanimity existed at the time of trial, trial court should have 
been aware of defects in instructions); see also State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1228-29 (Utah 1993) (claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error contain similar elements; 
where no authority was in effect when error allegedly occurred, 
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel failed). 
Maestas has relied on case law establishing the relevant 
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analysis in this jurisdiction. The trial judge and counsel 
should have been aware of the unlawful investigation and arrest 
that served as the basis for the warrantless search. Failure to 
address the matter in the suppression hearing before the trial 
court constituted plain error and/or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The evidence confiscated during the warrantless search 
should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Maestas respectfully requests reversal of the convictions 
for the reasons as set forth above, and as further set forth in 
the opening Brief of Appellant, and remand of the matter as this 
Court may deem appropriate. 
SUBMITTED this 30±IL day of < 3 ^ l , 1999. 
LINDA M. JONES / 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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1 YOU COULD MONITOR THE CONVERSATION ON THE WIRE? 
2 A. YES, SIR. 
3 Q. AND SPECIFICALLY, WHERE WERE YOU LOCATED? 
4I A. I WAS IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE APPLEMAN 
5 APARTMENT, THE COMPLEX THAT SHE LIVED IN, IN A 
6 SURVEILLANCE VAN. 
7 Q. WAS ANYONE ELSE IN THAT VAN WITH YOU? 
8 A. THERE WERE TWO OTHER OFFICERS, YES. 
9 Q. AND DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME WERE YOU 
10 ABLE TO OVERHEAR THE CONVERSATIONS THAT OCCURRED 
11 AROUND MR. WALDRON? 
12 A. YES. 
13 Q. NOW, WERE YOU AWARE WHEN MR. WALDRON LEFT 
14 TO GO INTO THE APARTMENT? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. AFTER HE ARRIVED AT THE APARTMENT, WAS 
17 THERE CONVERSATION THAT YOU COULD OVERHEAR? 
18 A. YES, THERE WAS. 
19 Q. HOW MANY PERSONS WERE INVOLVED IN THAT 
20 CONVERSATION? 
21 A. WHEN HE ORIGINALLY ENTERED? 
22 Q. YES. 
23 A. I BELIEVE THERE WAS JUST HE AND A FEMALE. 
24 Q. AND THEN DID YOU HEAR A SUBSEQUENT 
25 CONVERSATION AFTER THAT TIME WITH SOMEONE ELSE? 
1 SHE SAID THAT HE OFTEN COMES BY OUR 
2 APARTMENT, AND YOU KNOW, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY 
3 BEFORE THE SUPPLIER ARRIVED THAT HE WOULD MAYBE DROP 
4 1 BY, AND THEY COULD GET COCAINE FROM HIM. 
5 Q. SO MR. MAESTAS WAS NOT THE PERSON WHO YOU 
6 WERE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT BY PHONE? 
7 A. NO. 
8I Q. WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
9 A. WE WAITED AROUND FOR A WHILE. SHE DIDN'T 
10 GET THE RETURN CALL, SO I SUGGESTED THAT WE GO BACK 
11 TO THE APARTMENT COMPLEX IN CASE HE STOPPED BY. SHE 
12 SAID THAT WAS A GOOD IDEA, BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T LEAVE 
13 IT WITH ANYONE ELSE. WE PULLED INTO THE PARKING 
14 LOT, AND MR. MAESTAS WAS THERE WITH ANOTHER 
15 GENTLEMAN. THEY WERE STANDING BY A GRAY CAR. SHE 
16 SAYS, "WELL, THERE THEY ARE NOW." SHE SAYS, "I KNOW 
17 I CAN GET SOME STUFF FROM THEM." 
18 Q. ALL RIGHT. WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
19 A. I DROPPED HER OFF AND TURNED THE CAR 
20 AROUND. SHE COME UP TO THE CAR AND SHE SAID — SHE 
21 POINTED TO TONY AND SHE SAYS, "WELL, HE ALREADY SOLD 
22 HIM COCAINE." 
23 Q. ALL RIGHT. WHAT DID YOU DO THEN? 
24 A. I PARKED THE CAR RIGHT NEXT TO THEIR CAR 
25 AND WAITED FOR TONY TO COME OUT OF THE APARTMENT. 
1 INVESTIGATORS. 
2 Q. WAS THAT A SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT? 
3 A. YES, IT WAS. 
4 1 Q. WHAT WERE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES 
5 IN THAT OPERATION? 
6 A. I WAS WORKING IN THE SURVEILLANCE VEHICLE, 
7 MONITORING THE TELESCOPE. 
8 I Q. WHAT WAS — WOULD YOU DESCRIBE A LITTLE BIT 
9 WHAT THE TELESCOPE WAS, AND WHAT IT ENABLED YOU TO 
10 DO? 
11 A. IT'S MORE OR LESS LIKE BEING IN A 
12 SUBMARINE. IT'S GOT TWO-WAY MIRRORS YOU CAN LOOK 
13 OUTSIDE AND SEE WHAT'S HAPPENING OUTSIDE WITHOUT 
14 ANYONE SEEING WHAT'S HAPPENING. IT'S JUST THROUGH A 
15 VENT IN THE TOP OF THE VAN. 
16 Q. NOW, WERE YOU IN THE SURVEILLANCE VAN AT 
17 ABOUT NOON OR AFTER WHEN THE INCIDENT THAT WE ARE 
18 HEARING ABOUT IN THIS CASE TODAY AROSE? 
19 A. YES, I WAS. 
20 Q. AND DID YOU HAVE OCCASION ON THAT DATE 
21 WHILE YOU WERE IN THE VAN TO OBSERVE TWO MEXICAN 
22 INDIVIDUALS ARRIVE AT THE APARTMENT COMPLEX? 
23 A. YES, I DID. 
24 Q. AND WHEN DID YOU FIRST KNOW THAT? 
25 A. THEY DROVE INTO THE APARTMENT COMPLEX, 
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1 PARKED DIRECTLY NORTH OF THE APARTMENT THAT WE WAS 
2 MONITORING. THEY BOTH EXITED THEIR VEHICLE, AND 
3 PROCEEDED TOWARD THE APARTMENT. 
4I Q. HAD YOU SEEN MR. WALDRON PREVIOUSLY GOING 
5 INTO THAT APARTMENT? 
6 A. YES, I HAD. 
7 Q. ABOUT HOW LONG BEFORE HE WENT INTO THAT 
8I APARTMENT DID YOU SEE THESE TWO PERSONS COME? 
9 A. HE'D BEEN IN THERE PROBABLY TOTAL TIME 
10 MAYBE AN HOUR. 
11 Q. NOW — 
12 A. FROM THE TIME WE SET UP. 
13 Q. NOW, WERE THERE RADIO FACILITIES IN THE VAN 
14 ALSO? 
15 A. YES. 
16 Q. WERE YOU ABLE TO OVERHEAR DURING THAT 
17 PERIOD OF TIME THE CONVERSATION FROM THE APARTMENT? 
18 A. YES. 
19 Q. NOW, WHEN THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS APPROACHED 
20 THE APARTMENT, WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
21 A. WE WAS ABLE TO HEAR OVER THE WIRE 
22 CONVERSATIONS. TONY, THE C.I. INDICATED THAT HE WAS 
23 OUT FROM THE STATE PRISON ON A RELEASE. THERE WAS 
24 SOME CONVERSATIONS THAT HE WAS THERE TO BUY 
25 NARCOTICS. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS, I DON'T KNOW 
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1 WHICH ONE, ASKED TONY IF HE WAS A COP. AND THEN ONE 
2 OF THE MALES LEFT THE APARTMENT, PROCEEDED BACK OUT 
3 INTO THE PARKING LOT AND STOOD BY THE VEHICLE. 
4I Q. NOW, HE WAS STANDING OUTSIDE WHILE THE 
5 OTHER ONE WAS INSIDE? 
6 A. YES. ONE REMAINED INSIDE WITH TONY. ONE 
7 WAS OUTSIDE BY THE VEHICLE. 
8 Q. FROM YOUR UNDERSTANDING, AS YOU HEARD THE 
9 CONVERSATION, DID THE TRANSACTION TAKE PLACE AFTER 
10 THE INDIVIDUAL HAD LEFT THE APARTMENT? 
11 A. YES. 
12 Q. WERE YOU ABLE TO RECOGNIZE OR IDENTIFY THAT 
13 PERSON THROUGH YOUR PERISCOPE OR TELESCOPE? 
14 A. AT THAT POINT I GIVE THE DESCRIPTION OF 
15 BOTH SUSPECTS, PLUS THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE CAR TO 
16 THE THE OTHER OFFICERS IN THE VAN WITH ME, THE 
17 SURVEILLANCE VAN, AND THEY IN TURN RELAYED THAT 
18 INFORMATION. 
19 Q. WAS THAT THE INFORMATION THAT HE HAD WHEN 
20 THEY CHOSE TO PULL HIM OVER AT A LATER TIME? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE PERSON WHO WAS 
23 WAITING OUTSIDE THE APARTMENT, WERE YOU ABLE TO 
24 RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL OR DISCERN HIM WELL ENOUGH 
25 TO IDENTIFY HIM? 
Ill 
A. I WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO NOW, YOU KNOW. IT 
WAS OVER A YEAR AGO. 
Q. THANK YOU. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. GORDON: 
Q. OFFICER, DID YOU TELL ME THAT YOU AT ANY 
POINT SAW THE DEFENDANT MR. MAESTAS DO ANYTHING 
WRONG? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. YOU PERSONALLY DIDN'T SEE HIM? 
A. NO. 
Q. NOW, WHERE DID YOU GET YOUR INFORMATION 
THAT HE DID SOMETHING WRONG? 
A. THE WIRE ON THE C.I. I KNOW WE WERE 
MONITORING THAT, AND OVERHEARD THROUGH THE WIRE THAT 
THE DRUG TRANSACTION HAD GONE DOWN. 
Q. NOW, DO YOU RECALL THE LANGUAGE THAT 
INDICATED A DRUG TRANSACTION HAD OCCURRED? 
A. THERE WAS TALK OF MONEY. I CAN REMEMBER 
THAT. I CAN'T REMEMBER EXACTLY THE WORDING. 
Q. A SOMEWHAT ABSTRACT CONVERSATION? 
A. I CAN'T REMEMBER EXACTLY THE WORDS. I JUST 
REMEMBER THEM TALKING ABOUT AMOUNTS. AND I CAN 
REMEMBER THAT ONE OF THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WAS QUITE 
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1 NERVOUS WHEN THEY STARTED TALKING, WONDERING IF HE 
2 WAS A COP, BECAUSE THERE IS ALWAYS A WORRY THAT 
3 POSSIBLY THEY ARE GOING TO PAT HIM DOWN. AND I 
4I DIDN'T WANT HIM — IF THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND THE WIRE 
5 IT WAS AN EXTREME DANGER TO THE C.I. AT THAT POINT. 
6 Q. YOU REALLY NEVER HEARD ACTUALLY THE DIRECT 
7 CONVERSATION INDICATING A DRUG BUY HAD OCCURRED? 
8 FOR EXAMPLE, YOU DIDN'T HEAR SOMEONE SAY, WELL, HERE 
9 IS — HOW MUCH DO YOU NEED FOR CERTAIN AMOUNT OF 
10 DRUGS? AND THE OTHER PERSON SAID, THIS MUCH, AND 
11 THEY SAID, WELL I HAVE THAT AMOUNT. AND THEN THEY 
12 SAID, I'LL TAKE THE DRUGS, OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT? 
13 A. I CAN'T REMEMBER ANYTHING TO THAT STATE. I 
14 REMEMBER THEM TALKING MONEY. I REMEMBER SOMETHING 
15 TO DO WITH A HUNDRED DOLLARS. AGAIN, I WAS RUNNING 
16 THE TELESCOPE, AND ANOTHER AGENT WAS RUNNING THE 
17 BUG. I JUST COULD OVERHEAR IT. 
18 MR. GORDON: I UNDERSTAND. I HAVE NO 
19 FURTHER QUESTIONS FOR YOU, OFFICER. THANK YOU VERY 
20 MUCH. 
21 A. OKAY. 
22 MR. SHEPHERD: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS OF THIS 
23 WITNESS. 
24 THE COURT: MAY THIS WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
25 MR. GORDON: YES, HE MAY. 
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1 Q. NOW, DID YOU CONDUCT THE SEARCH ON MR. 
21 MAESTAS? 
3 A. YES. I DID A PAT-DOWN SEARCH UPON THE 
4I INDIVIDUAL AS HE STEPPED OUT OF THE VEHICLE. 
5 Q. WAS MR. VAROS ALSO INVOLVED IN THIS? 
6 A. YES, HE WAS. 
7 Q. WHAT WAS HIS INVOLVEMENT? 
8 A. HIS INVOLVEMENT WAS THAT HE — I BELIEVE HE 
9 PATTED HIM DOWN INITIALLY TO MAKE SURE THERE WAS NO 
10 WEAPONS UPON HIM. MY PROCEDURE IS THAT IF I'M GOING 
11 TO BE RESPONSIBILE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL I'M GOING TO 
12 RE-PAT HIM DOWN FOR MY SECURITY. I AM MORE SECURE 
13 WITH MY OWN TECHIQUE. AND I PLACED THE HANDCUFFS ON 
14 HIM AT THAT POINT. 
15 Q. OKAY. IN THE COURSE OF SEARCHING HIM, DID 
16 YOU FIND ANYTHING? 
17 A. YES, I DID. SEARCHING THE INDIVIDUAL'S 
18 LEFT FRONT POCKET, I FOUND A DOLLAR BILL. THE 
19 DOLLAR BILL WAS — HAD A WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE. 
20 ALSO REMOVED OUT OF THE POCKET WAS A WALLET WITH 
21 $385.25. 
22 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT DEMONINATIONS THOSE 
23 BILLS WERE? 
24 A. THEY WERE HUNDREDS, FIFTIES, TENS. 
25 Q. I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED FOR 
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SUBSTANCES WERE? 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. WHAT ARE THOSE SUBSTANCES, IN YOUR OPINION? 
A. COCAINE. 
Q. WHAT ARE THE AMOUNTS? 
A. ONE OF THEM WAS 320 MILLIGRAMS, AND ONE OF 
THEM WAS 1.3 GRAMS. 
Q. THANK YOU. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: CROSS EXAMINATION? 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. GORDON: 
Q. NOW, YOU HAVE PERFORMED A COLOR TEST? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. AND WHAT TYPE OF TEST IS THAT? 
A. IT'S CALLED A SCOTT'S TEST, AND IT'S JUST A 
SIMPLE COLOR TEST WHERE I TOOK A LITTLE BIT OF THE 
SAMPLE, PERCENTAGE OF THE SAMPLE, AND I PUT IT IN A 
SPOT PLATE AND I'LL ADD A REAGENT TO IT. AND IT 
WILL GIVE ME SPECIFIC COLOR. 
Q. I SEE. NOW, IS THIS AN INFALLIBLE TEST? 
A. WHAT DO YOU MEAN, INFALLIBLE? 
Q. CAN MISTAKES BE MADE ON THIS TEST, OR IS 
THIS JUST A FOOL-PROOF TEST, THAT ONCE IT'S DONE, 
THAT'S IT" 
